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DISCRIMINATION AT PLACES OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION AFTER MASTERPIECE
CAKESHOP, LTD. V. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS
COMMISSION
by
Gwen Seaquist*
Marlene Barken**
Alka Bramhandkar***
The recent decision in Obergefell v Hodges 1 provided
members of the LGBT community with much needed forward
momentum towards equality. In that opinion, the Supreme
Court extended the fundamental right of marriage to same-sex
couples. Therefore, when the court announced it would review
the case Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, many assumed it would also advance gay rights
another step. Given the circumstances of the case, such a
perspective was not unrealistic. The case involved two gay men
in Colorado who were refused a wedding cake for their
marriage ceremony by a Denver bakery. It was exactly this
type of blatant discrimination that Colorado’s anti*Professor of Law, Department of Accounting & Law, Ithaca
College School of Business
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discrimination statute (Colorado Anti-discrimination Act also
known as CADA) 2was supposed to prevent. Despite statutory
protection, however, similar types of discrimination occur
regularly. In its amicus brief, for example, the Lambda Legal
Defense Fund noted “With disturbing frequency, LGBT people
are confronted by ‘we don’t serve your kind’ refusals and other
unequal treatment in a wide range of public accommodations
contexts.” 3 Thus, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to
send a message that discrimination at place of public
accommodation would not be tolerated.
Therefore, it came as a disappointment to many that the
Masterpiece Cakeshop decision did not rule in favor of the gay
men or protect this class of individuals. Instead, the court chose
a very narrow ruling focused on an error in the administrativelevel process. The decision missed an important opportunity to
establish precedent to protect the LGBT community from
discrimination.

HISTORY OF THE CASE
The controversy began in 2012 when David Mullins and
Charlie Craig, along with Craig’s mother, went shopping for a
wedding cake in Colorado. Although they could not get
married in that state, they planned a ceremony in
Massachusetts with the reception to follow in Colorado. The
trio visited a bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. owned by
Jack Phillips. There, they looked at a book of cake designs that
Phillips had created. As the discussion ensued, and it became
evident to Phillips that the men were talking about a wedding
for themselves, he refused to continue the discussion,
explaining that the Company had a policy of not creating
wedding cakes for same-sex couples. He offered to make them
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any other kind of cake, but could not, based on his religious
beliefs, make a cake that supported gay marriage.
Significantly, the entire discussion about the wedding cake
took less than twenty seconds. There was no discussion of what
words, symbols or designs the couple might want. As far as the
baker Jack Phillips knew, the cake ultimately requested by the
couple could have been a plain white one. But the discussion
never reached that point as Phillips ended it as soon as he
learned that the men were gay.
Ultimately the men did marry and celebrated with a
wedding cake baked by another store in Colorado. But
understandably, they did not forget the rejection and
discrimination they endured. Subsequently, they filed a
discrimination claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division.
Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute states:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a
person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold
from, or deny to an individual or a group,
because of . . . sexual orientation . . . the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of a place of public
accommodation.4
The complaint process began by filing with the state’s civil
rights division, which then investigated and decided whether
probable cause existed. Here, after probable cause was
determined, Phillips appealed, thus moving the case before the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, an administrative board
composed of seven people. During those hearings, which took
place over a number of days, the Commission heard testimony
from the men and from Phillips about what had transpired at
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the bakery. This caused one member of the Commission to
make the following statement:
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing
or the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion
has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination
throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be
the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has
been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one
of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can
use to—to use their religion to hurt others.5
This statement later served as an important lynchpin when
the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. It formed the
basis for Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion because
it showed such disdain for religion thereby precluding a fair
review of free exercise arguments.
The Commission went on to affirm the findings of the
Division and held that Phillips violated CADA. It ordered
Phillips to design wedding cakes for both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples and to train his staff about compliance
with the discrimination law. The cake shop appealed that
decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals where it was again
upheld 6 and then to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari. By now, the case had attracted national
attention. Many organizations weighed in on a variety of
constitutional issues. Over 100 amicus briefs were filed by
organizations ranging from the Cato Institute and Foundation
for Moral Law to the Transgender Law Center and National
Women’s Law Center, First Amendment advocates, law
professors and a multitude of religious organizations.
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PETITIONER PHILLIP’S BRIEF
Phillip’s suddenly underwent a complete transformation,
from a mere baker to a “cake artist.” In the Petition for
Certiorari, his attorneys described him as, “Designing and
creating specially commissioned cakes…(as) a form of art
and creative expression, the pinnacle of which is wedding
cakes. Phillips pours himself into their design and creation,
marshaling his time, energy, and creative talents to make a
one-of-a-kind creation celebrating the couple’s special day
and reflecting his artistic interpretation of their special
bond.”7
“Coupled with the Petitioner’s artistry: they continued, “is
the source of his abilities: his deep and abiding religious
beliefs. Phillips believes that he …honors God through his
work by declining to use his creative talents to design and
create cakes that violate his religious beliefs. This includes
cakes with offensive written messages and cakes celebrating
events or ideas …celebrating Halloween (a decision that costs
him significant revenue), anti-American or antifamily themes,
atheism, racism, or indecency.” 8
By characterizing Jack Phillips as a creative artist and a
deeply religious man, the stage was set for the legal arguments
which included three themes. First, that being forced to make a
cake for a same-sex wedding violated Phillip’s freedom of
religion; second that forcing him to make the cake interfered
with his free exercise rights; and third, that forcing him to
make the cake was in effect making him speak in favor of gay
marriage. Because the cake would be seen in public and
everyone would know he made it, he was being forced to
portray gay marriage positively. In short, the state was coerced
or compelled his speech.

2019 / Discrimination at Places of Public / 108

The Free Exercise Argument
Scholars may differ on whether or not making a cake is an
artistic endeavor protected by the First Amendment. But
assuming that it is, then historically, public accommodation
laws like Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute have withstood
First Amendment challenges. If this were not so, then
discrimination laws would always be subject to a Free Exercise
Clause argument. For example, a store owner could deny
selling to African Americans on the basis of religious beliefs or
refuse to sell goods to women.
The precedent for this is an opinion written by Justice Scalia
in Employment Division v. Smith. 9 Two men were fired from
their jobs for smoking peyote. They claimed smoking was part
of their religious expression. Since the law prohibiting peyote
“was generally applicable to the public” and did not signal out
a particular religion, it did not violate the free exercise clause.
“Generally applicable to the public” is the salient feature when
determining if a state statute is discriminatory on the basis of
religion. Since the Colorado statute was generally applicable to
the public and did not single out a particular religion, then the
free exercise argument would fail, as the statute trumped the
free exercise argument.
The Coerced Speech Argument
Just as free speech protects the right to make
pronouncements, so too it protects people from being forced to
say anything. Forcing people to make speech in favor of the
government is known as coerced speech.
Coerced speech is the opposite of ‘free speech.’ The idea is
that the government uses the actor to make pronouncements
he/she would not ordinarily make to advance a cause of the
state. Thus, by ordering the cake maker to comply with the
Colorado anti-discrimination statute and make cakes for same-
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sex couples, the state is arguably forcing him to speak in favor
of same-sex marriage. Is it within the power of the government
to compel a private citizen “to utter what is not in his mind”?
The parameters of coerced speech have been well-defined
by the court in three cases. In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnett10 the State of West Virginia mandated
that all students state the pledge of allegiance each morning in
school. Students who refused to conform were deemed
insubordinate and faced possible expulsion while their parents
were subjected to fines and possible jail time. Jehovah’s
Witnesses brought a lawsuit against West Virginia for violating
their First Amendment rights because as part of their religious
beliefs, the flag is an “image” and saluting the flag a “graven
image” in violation of the Bible’s Exodus Chapter 20.
Mandating that all students recite the pledge was therefore “a
compulsion to declare a belief.” 11The Supreme Court agreed
holding that
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us. 12
Similarly, in Wooley v Maynard,13 Jehovah’s Witnesses
opposed a New Hampshire statute requiring cars to display a
license plate with the phrase “Live Free or Die” embossed on
it. In his affidavit filed with the District Court, Mr. Maynard
stated, “I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a
slogan which I find morally, ethically, religiously and
politically abhorrent.” 14Likening the license plate to a “mobile
billboard” for the state’s ideological message the court held
that the “State may not constitutionally require an individual to
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participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public.” 15
The court compared the case to Barnette, finding that the state
was again forcing citizens to be instruments of adherence to an
ideological point of view. “In doing so, the State invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First
Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control. The right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.”16
Of the three cases, perhaps the most important one dealing
with coerced speech is Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. 17Here, an unincorporated
association (the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council
referred to as the Alliance) was authorized by the City of
Boston to organize and conduct the annual St. Patrick’s Day
Parade. As such, the Alliance was responsible for deciding
what groups could march in the parade. They issued an
invitation to members of the public inviting them to march in
the parade and accepted nearly every group that applied except
the LGBT group. 18
The Massachusetts courts held that the parade organizers
had engaged in unlawful discrimination and ordered them to
include the group. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
It explained that the state applied its public accommodation
law “in a peculiar way,” 19when it required the parade
organizers to alter the content of their expression to
accommodate “any contingent of protected individuals with a
message,” 20This violated the First Amendment right of
speakers “to choose the content of [their] own message,” and
decide “what merits celebration,”21 even if the state or some
individuals deem those choices “misguided, or even hurtful.” 22

111 / Vol 38 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

Hurley is especially applicable to Masterpiece Cakeshop,
because it is one of the few examples of free speech principles
overriding a state discrimination law. Hurley established that
“the state cannot apply a public-accommodation law to force
individuals engaged in expression to alter what they
communicate, much less to celebrate something that they deem
objectionable. This is particularly true for speakers, like the
parade organizers in Hurley, who exclude no class of people
but merely decline to express certain ideas. Similarly, it could
be argued that the cake maker would be forced to alter what he
(normally) communicated on his cakes if the court enforced the
Colorado statute against his business.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT MAJORITY DECISION
Justice Kennedy wrote for a 7-2 majority reversing the
decision of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. At first
blush, the reversal appears to allow Masterpiece Cakeshop to
discriminate against customers based on sexual orientation. Yet
the court never reached a decision about whether the bakery’s
free exercise and free speech rights were violated. The court
never addressed the substantive questions in the case.
In his opinion, Justice Kennedy began by reassuring the
LGBT community. \
Our society has come to the recognition that gay
persons and gay couples cannot
treated as social
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the
laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances
must, protect them in the
exercise of their civil rights. The
exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be
given great weight and respect by the courts.23
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The primary issue in the case, and the one that most
followers of the court had hoped would be resolved was
whether places of public accommodation, like a store, give up
religious beliefs in favor of protected classes? Could the owner
of a cake shop refuse to make a wedding cake for a gay couple
despite Colorado’s statutory protection of gays at places of
public accommodation?
As a rule, when there is a clash between business owners
and protected classes, the protected classes will prevail as long
as the statute giving them protection is not an arbitrary or
biased law. “While those religious and philosophical
objections are protected, it is a general rule that such objections
do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy
and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods
and services under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law.”24 What constitutes a ‘neutral and
generally applicable public accommodations law’ becomes key
in deciding the outcome.
Phillip’s case, however, might be an exception according to
Kennedy, because “the baker found it difficult to find a line
where the customers’ rights to goods and services became a
demand for him to exercise the right of his own personal
expression for their message, a message he could not express in
a way consistent with his religious beliefs.”25 And it was
exactly that decision that provoked such interest in the case. If
on the one hand the statute is enforced, then the free exercise
clause does not protect one’s religious interests; but if religion
is allowed to excuse shopkeepers from compliance, this allows
shopkeepers to discriminate with impunity.
Unfortunately, the court never reached the issue of free
speech, freedom or religion or whether the statute was ‘neutral
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and generally applicable.’ And herein lies the disappointment
with the decision. The court harkened all the way back to the
hearing that had taken place many years before at the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission. Recall that when the case was
initially reviewed there, one of the commissioners made the
following statement:
We can list hundreds of situations where freedom of
religion has been used to
justify discrimination. And to me
it is one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that
people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others. 26
The court found this statement was evidence of a profound
disrespect for the baker’s sincere religious beliefs, thus tainting
the board’s decision. “The baker was entitled to a neutral
decision maker who would give full and fair consideration to
his religious objection.”27 The “clear and impermissible
hostility” violated the baker’s free exercise rights. Because the
hearing board’s conduct was prejudiced against the cake
maker, the court did not reach a decision weighing the statute
against free exercise rights.
The delicate question of when the free exercise of his
religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of
state power needed to be determined in an adjudication
in which religious hostility on the part of the state itself
would not be a factor in the balance the state sought to
reach. That requirement, however, was not met here.
When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
considered this case, it did not do so with the religious
neutrality that the Constitution requires.28
The court said that the inconsistent treatment by the Civil
Rights Commission showed hostility towards Phillips’
religious faith. Colorado had violated its duty “not to base laws
or regulations on hostility to a religion or a religious
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viewpoint.”29 The state must “proceed in a manner neutral
toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.” The
commission had been “neither tolerant nor respectful”; it had
proceeded on the basis of “a negative normative ‘evaluation of
the justification’ for his objection” (quoting Lukumi). As a
result, the court did not further examine the free exercise
issues, leaving the question of which should prevail---the state
discrimination statute or the Petitioner’s religious rights--unanswered.
Finally, because the Colorado Commission had engaged in
discriminatory behavior toward Phillips (the baker), the Court
overturned the decision of the Commission. This left no other
options for the Mullins and Craig to appeal or have a rehearing, to a close their discrimination complaint.
The Kagan Concurrence
Justice Kagan explained in her concurrence that she
wished to elaborate on one basis of the Court’s holding.
She wanted to distinguish the current case from one
involving “three other bakers” also in Colorado, a case that
was working its way through the courts around the same
time as Masterpiece. The “three bakers” refers to a case
involving a man named Mr. Jack who went to three
different Denver, Colorado bakeries and asked each one to
make him a cake that included two Bible verses: “God
hates sin. Psalm 45:7” and “Homosexuality is a detestable
sin. Leviticus 18:2[2]” and then place two grooms holding
hands on the top with a red “X” placed over them.30 Each
of the three bakeries refused and Mr. Jack then brought his
case to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and Division
claiming religious discrimination.
In direct contravention to its holding in Masterpiece, the
Commission and Division both held that the three bakeries
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did not violate Colorado’s discrimination statute. This was so
because the bakeries could refuse to sell cakes with these
particular messages to any customer requesting them.
To Kagan, the standard that the public accommodations
law must be “neutral and generally applicable” means that all
customers who come into a store must be treated the same.
Therefore, she saw no contradiction between Masterpiece
and the “three bakeries.” In Masterpiece, the bakery was in
the wrong because it would make wedding cakes for some
people (heterosexuals) but not others (homosexuals); this
disparate treatment is discrimination. But in the “three
bakeries” none of the bakeries would make the cakes with the
hateful sayings on them for any customers, thereby treating
all customers the same. Therefore, the “three bakeries” did
not discriminate.
The Gorsuch Concurrence
Justice Gorsuch on the other hand, disagreed with Kagan’s
analysis. He emphasized the viewpoint of each cake maker and
whether the requested cake violated that person’s own beliefs.
For example, in the “three bakers case” Mr. Jack requested
cakes with messages inscribed on them denigrating same-sex
marriage. All three bakeries refused because they the bakers,
found the request offensive to their own beliefs. Gorsuch then
compared the three bakers’ refusal to that of Mr. Phillips, who
declined to make a cake with a message in favor of same-sex
marriage, because it violated his own beliefs. How could the
three bakeries be free from discrimination for refusing to make
the cakes when Phillips was discriminatory for refusing to
make the cake? Those are opposite results for the same act.
To Gorsuch this contradiction by the Commission showed that
it made its decisions based on whether or not it agreed with the
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message. “The Commission could not have it both ways,
setting a different standard when the message was one the
Commission supported (the “three bakers”) but finding
discrimination when the request went against gay people.
Gorsuch likened the Commission’s actions to a sliding scale
that resulted in unfair and disparate decisions based on the
Commission’s own prejudice.
The Ginsberg Dissent
Justice Ginsberg, in contrast to Gorsuch, viewed this case from
the standard of equal treatment. When the baker refused to
make a cake for the two men, it was not the message on the
cake, but their status as a gay couple that was significant.
Phillips discriminated because he would make a wedding cake
for some people (heterosexuals) but not others (homosexuals).
Treating people differently because of their sexual orientation
is a violation of the Colorado statute and thus the case should
not have been overturned by the Supreme Court.
In the Mr. Jack case, the baker refused to make a cake with a
hateful message. Because that baker would not make the
“hateful cake” for anyone; therefore, all customers were treated
equally. Since they were all treated equally, no one was
discriminated against and there was no statutory violation. The
Commission should have found such.
In short, it is not about speech or religion, but rather how the
law is applied that matters, and equal treatment under the law is
the test of discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Shortly after filing his Petition with the Supreme Court,
Jack Phillips received a call at his bakery. This time the person
on the other end of the phone asked Phillips if he would make
her a cake with a blue exterior and a pink interior. Then the
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caller disclosed that the color scheme represented her transition
from a male to a female. Phillips declined to make the cake 31
citing his religious beliefs as the reason.
This time, Phillips took the offensive and filed a lawsuit in
Federal District Court in Denver alleging that Colorado
officials are on a “crusade” against him. He argued that
because he refuses to make cakes that violate his religious
beliefs, the state is “out to get him”. In recent years, his
lawyers say, he has been targeted by potential customers eager
to test the limit of the law.32
There is a very good reason that Phillips is back in court so
soon after the Supreme Court decision. The court failed to
answer the most important question at the heart of the case,
namely, can places of public accommodation discriminate
against protected classes? Instead the court chose to side-step
the question. What impact does this have? For Phillips, he has
become a target by anyone in the LGBT community who wants
to prove a point and use him to litigate. For those not inclined
to personally test the law, the door appears to be open to use
religion as a reason to discriminate with impunity. One can
imagine numerous scenarios in which business owners profess
a religious belief to avoid serving any number of people. A dry
cleaner who hates Muslims can claim his religion does not
permit him to clean clothes of another faith; a doctor may
refuse to treat a pregnant woman who is not married on
religious grounds; the list is endless. Since the court provided
no guidance on the issue, nor admonishment of Phillip’s
actions toward the gay men, there appears to be at least a tacit
nod of approval for his role in violating the statute and
blatantly discriminating.
Not only may the court be reflecting its own conservatism,
but the allowance of discrimination and bigotry may also
reflect the country’s leaning toward a more conservative view
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of gay rights. A poll taken after the Masterpiece decision
showed that close to half of all Americans (46 %) believe that
the owners of “wedding-based businesses, such as caterers and
bakers, should be allowed to refuse service to same-sex couples
if doing so violates their religious beliefs.” 33 The poll was
conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute and it
contains alarming information including data that shows
“Black American’s support for conservative business owners
like Phillips rose from 36% in 2017 to 45% this year while
Hispanic Americans support rose from 26 percent to 34
percent.” 34 Given the history of discrimination against Blacks
and Hispanics, the fact that these groups support discrimination
against another protected class is surprising.
Some court watchers believe that Masterpiece II will likely
end up at the Supreme Court, but the decision this time will
address religion and discrimination against gays. Given the
conservative nature of the court, that may not be good news for
the LGBT community. If public perception is any indication of
where the court would land, religious freedom certainly seems
to be the “winner.” Just look at recent headlines regarding the
second case against the baker:
•
•
•

Colorado end your crusade against
Masterpiece Cakeshop35.
Colorado Hauls Vindicated Christian
Baker Back to Court.36
Hostility Unabated: Colorado seeks to
punish cake artist Jack Phillips37

If the past behavior of the court is any indication, then the fact
the court found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
showed prejudice based on one statement made by a
Commission member regarding the use of religion to justify
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discrimination is alarming. Compare that finding to the court’s
reasoning in Trump v. Hawaii, upholding the Muslim travel
ban. In that case, despite President Trump’s frequent antiMuslim statements, the court voted 5-4 to impose a travel ban.
This is clearly irrational when on the one hand a statement by a
commissioner results in a finding of religious hostility but an
entire political campaign and election based on banning a
religious groups is not hostile. “In contrast to Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the evidence of anti-religious animus in the Muslim
ban case is unambiguous and consistent. And it all flows from
President Trump, the person singularly responsible for the
policy. He formally called for a “shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States” in a statement that remained on his
campaign website well into his presidency.”38
Finally, if the Supreme Court does allow shop owners to use
religion as a basis for discrimination, it is difficult to see where
any limits would exist. Once the doors are open to discriminate
against one group, then the underpinnings are in place to
extend legalized discrimination against others. One reason for
the supposed equal application of the law is to prevent such an
outcome. Yet, given the actions of this court, the likelihood of
a future outcome consistent with precedent seems unlikely.
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